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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and
activists have supported policies to eliminate disparities in access to
healthy food and, by doing so, reduce diet-related chronic diseases.
These efforts have involved a wide range of interventions, from the
creation of new farmers’ markets to programs encouraging
convenience stores to sell fresh produce. One of the most prominent
food access interventions uses incentives to lure supermarkets to socalled “food deserts,” communities deemed to have insufficient fullservice food retail.1 Federal, state, and municipal governments have
invested hundreds of millions of dollars to subsidize supermarket
development through such programs.2 However, research has shown
that merely expanding access to food retail has no appreciable effect
on shopping patterns, food choices, health, obesity, or diet-related
diseases.3 Support for these interventions has nonetheless continued
to grow—obscuring underlying issues and detracting from more
effective strategies.
This Article examines the emergence of food access as a policy
issue, current approaches to increasing food access, and possible
alternatives. Part I discusses the development of the current food
access narrative, focusing on its appeal to policymakers, urban
planners, and public health officials. Part II describes policies to
increase access to food retail. Part III reviews research on the
relationship between food retail and health outcomes. Part IV

1. See infra Part I. The first large-scale intervention of this type in the United
States was the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, which used over $145
million in loans and grants to finance eighty-eight retail projects between 2004 and
2010. THE FOOD TRUST, HEALTHY FOOD ACCESS IN PENNSYLVANIA: BUILDING ON
SUCCESS, REINVESTING IN COMMUNITIES, CREATING JOBS 2 (2015). In 2010,
President Obama created a multi-agency federal program modeled after the
Pennsylvania initiative. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama
Administration Details Healthy Food Financing Initiative (Feb. 19, 2010),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg555.aspx
[https://perma.cc/GJJ7-Q5RG]. The Obama administration pledged to commit more
than $400 million to the new program, called the Healthy Food Financing Initiative
(“HFFI”). Id. Several states and municipalities have also created similar initiatives to
expand supermarket development, often using seed capital from HFFI.
Memorandum from the 6th Annual Convening on Healthy Food Access: HFFI
Messaging and Talking Points (May 3, 2017), http://www.healthyfoodaccess.org/
sites/default/files/HFFI%20TPs%202017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FTA-NNCZ].
2. See infra Part II. The federal government alone has distributed more than
$500 million through the HFFI. Brian Elbel et al., Assessment of a Government-

Subsidized Supermarket in a High-Need Area on Household Food Availability and
Children’s Dietary Intakes, 18 PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 2881, 2882 (2015).
3. See infra Part III.
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examines why increasing food access persists as a policy goal despite
its demonstrated failure to reduce health inequities. Finally, Part V
proposes alternative strategies for reducing economic and health
disparities within food systems.
I. THE FOOD ACCESS NARRATIVE
The concept of food access was originally applied to dynamics
within developing countries with severely malnourished populations.4
It was meant to reorient anti-hunger efforts away from a simplistic
focus on food availability—the physical supply of food—toward one
that also considered the ability of people to secure, or access, that
food.5 By the late 1970s, recognizing that the Green Revolution
failed to end famines and malnourishment despite increasing
agricultural yields,6 food security scholars and practitioners
increasingly emphasized the need to match food availability with food
access.7 Economist and philosopher Amartya Sen popularized the
concept of food access in the early 1980s, demonstrating that famines
were not the result of insufficient food availability, but rather of
policies dictating how people acquired and controlled food, which
often deprived the poor of the means to access otherwise plentiful
food supplies.8 Conventional forms of food assistance, which focused
on distributing surplus food to impoverished countries, were
challenged for perpetuating dependency on donor countries.9 A 1986

4. This Article focuses on the narrative of “food access” as used and applied in
the Global North. There remains a distinct literature on access to food in developing
countries that is grounded in different methodologies and concerns, and accordingly
offers a different set of interventions.
5. Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Food Security: Definition and Measurement, 1 FOOD
SECURITY 5, 5 (2009).
6. The Green Revolution, which lasted between 1966 and 1985, tripled the
production of cereal crops—with only a thirty percent increase in land area
cultivated—through substantial public expenditures on agricultural research,
technology, and infrastructure. Prabhu L. Pingali, Green Revolution: Impacts, Limits,
and the Path Ahead, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12302, 12302 (2012).
7. Id. Writing in 1977, for example, the development scholar Peter Timmer
argued for increased research on the dynamics of food access in order to understand
why “the hungriest parts of the population” of “poor countries” remained
malnourished despite the Green Revolution. C. Peter Timmer, Access to Food: The
Ultimate Determinant of Hunger, 300 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 59, 60–61 (1977).
8. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION 1–8 (1981).
9. Anne C. Bellows & Michael W. Hamm, International Effects on and
Inspiration for Community Food Security Policies and Practices in the USA,
13 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 107, 111 (2003).
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World Bank report on food security in developing countries
summarized the new conventional wisdom:
The world has ample food. The growth of global food production
has been faster than the unprecedented population growth of the
past forty years. . . . Yet many poor countries and hundreds of
millions of poor people do not share in this abundance. They suffer
from a lack of food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing
power.10

The report defined “food security” as “access by all people at all
times to enough food for an active, healthy life” and “food insecurity”
as “the lack of access to enough food.”11
A. Third Way Politics and Food Access
By the early 1990s, policymakers and social movements in the
Global North began to focus on food access within their own
countries. Tony Blair’s government in the United Kingdom played a
critical role in shaping discourse on food access in Europe and North
America by emphasizing the availability of conventional food
retailers to the exclusion of other factors. “Improved access” quickly
became defined as “improved access to food retail”—despite the
emergence of social movements that sought to address food
disparities in a more comprehensive way.12 Food insecurity in
advanced economies thus became framed as a market failure that
could be addressed, it was believed, through incentives for, and
private-public partnerships with, food retailers.13 This narrative

10. WORLD BANK, POVERTY AND HUNGER: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR FOOD
SECURITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (1986), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/166331467990005748/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EJB-ZWLD].
11. Id.
12. The environmental justice movement, for example, called for both distributive
and procedural equity in all aspects of the environment, including food systems. See
Robert Gottlieb & Andrew Fisher, Community Food Security and Environmental
Justice: Searching for a Common Discourse, 3 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 23, 23–25
(1996). The community food security movement, which grew to prominence in the
mid-1990s, sought to accomplish long-term food security that included adequate
income, food quality and cultural appropriateness, affordability, and sustainability.
13. The first major publicly-funded program in the United States to incentivize
supermarket development was spurred, in part, by a 2001 campaign by The Food
Trust called “Food for Every Child,” which sought to address dietary disparities
exclusively through expanded access to food retail. See THE FOOD TRUST, SPECIAL
REPORT: THE NEED FOR MORE SUPERMARKETS IN PHILADELPHIA 1 (2001). As part
of the campaign, The Food Trust released a report arguing that market failure had
left lower-income neighborhoods bereft of supermarkets, resulting in significant
disparities in nutrition and diet-related disease. Id. at 1, 6. Their solution was simple:
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proved particularly attractive to municipal policymakers, who sought
to entice investors back into capital-starved cities, and public health
officials, who were eager to identify environmental factors in the
emerging obesity “epidemic.” The concept of food access, which Sen
had used to explain that poverty and property entitlements were the
root causes of food insecurity, had, by the late 1990s, been recast in
such a way so as to obscure those very issues.
Tony Blair won a commanding majority in the United Kingdom’s
1997 general election, bringing Labour to power for the first time in
eighteen years. Like Bill Clinton, his ideological counterpart in the
United States, Blair rejected wealth redistribution, government
intervention in markets, and increased public spending as outmoded
ideological solutions.14 Branding his politics as the “Third Way”—
between conservative Tories and the “hard left”—Blair portrayed
himself as a pragmatist capable of achieving progressive outcomes
through private sector growth, public-private partnerships, and
policies that encouraged individual responsibility and opportunity.15
“What counts,” Blair emphasized during the election, is not
“outdated ideology,” but “what works.”16
Blair had seized on the growing health divide between the rich and
poor as a campaign issue and promised to make reducing health
inequalities a central goal of his new government.17 Blair appointed

state and local governments must “take the lead in developing a public-private
response” and “invest in supermarket development.” Id. at 1.
14. See Curtis Atkins, The Third Way International, JACOBIN MAG. (Feb. 11,
2016), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/02/atkins-dlc-third-way-clinton-blairschroeder-social-democracy [https://perma.cc/JT8D-6MAW]. While Bill Clinton did
not take up food access as a major issue during his presidency, many of his fellow
centrist “New Democrats” were major proponents of market-based food access
interventions during the Obama administration. See generally, e.g., JOEL BERG,
PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., GOOD FOOD, GOOD JOBS: TURNING FOOD DESERTS INTO
JOBS OASES (2010), http://www.progressivefix.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/PPIPolicy-Report_BERG-Good-Food-Good-Jobs.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XRJ-TT9V].
15. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY 65 (1998) (suggesting “no rights without responsibilities” as a “prime
motto” for the movement); Atkins, supra note 14; Patrick Butler, Public-Private
Partnerships: The Issue Explained, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2001, 10:55 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2001/jun/25/ppp1
[https://perma.cc/XTA5GEVA] (discussing New Labour’s affinity for public-private partnerships).
16. Tim Harford, In Praise of Pragmatism, INDEPENDENT (June 6, 2011, 11:00
PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/in-praise-of-pragmatism-229
3820.html [https://perma.cc/Y8H3-84LS]; see THE LABOUR PARTY, NEW LABOUR
BECAUSE BRITAIN DESERVES BETTER (1997).
17. Mary Shaw et al., Health Inequalities and New Labour: How the Promises
Compare with Real Progress, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 1016, 1016 (2005); see also
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Tessa Jowell as his public health minister and established an
Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health led by the National
Health Services’ former chief medical officer, Sir Donald Acheson.18
Both Jowell and the Acheson Inquiry identified the proliferation of
so-called “food deserts,” communities with insufficient healthy food
retail, as a major problem and advocated for improving food access as
the solution.19 While the phrase “food desert” was first used in the
early 1990s by public housing residents in Scotland,20 the term was
included in a U.K. government report published in 1995, and the new
Labour government popularized it, warning that food deserts were a
“real problem” that gave rise to “virtually every major illness.”21 The
British media repeated such claims, often uncritically,22 while funding
for such research increased, resulting in a number of studies
purporting, at least initially, to link limited food access with poor diet
and health outcomes.23
Food deserts appeared to be a problem perfectly suited to Blair’s
Third Way approach. By working with the private sector to expand
food retail options, Labour promised a win-win for businesses and
low-income residents. “It’s the Third Way applied to shopping,” as
one advocate told The Guardian in 1999, describing a pilot project to
bring locally-owned corner stores to food deserts.24 While the corner

Michael G. Marmot, Tackling Health Inequalities Since the Acheson Inquiry, 58 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 262, 262 (2004).
18. RAY EARWICKER, Progress in Tackling Health Inequalities: A Policy Maker’s
Reflections, in CHALLENGING HEALTH INEQUALITIES: FROM ACHESON TO
‘CHOOSING HEALTH’ 17, 17 (Elizabeth Dowler & Nick Spencer eds., 2007).
19. ELIZABETH DOWLER, MARTIN CARAHER & PAUL LINCOLN, Inequalities in
Food and Nutrition: Challenging ‘Lifestyles’, in CHALLENGING HEALTH
INEQUALITIES: FROM ACHESON TO ‘CHOOSING HEALTH’, 127, 139 (Elizabeth Dowler
& Nick Spencer eds., 2007).
20. Steven Cummins et al., “Food Deserts”—Evidence and Assumption in Health
Policy Making, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 436, 436 (2002).
21. Valerie Elliott, ‘Food Deserts’ Threaten Health of Poor and Old, TIMES, Nov.
5, 1997, at 10.
22. See, e.g., id.; Martin Hickman, ‘Food Deserts’ Depriving Towns of Fresh
Fruits and Vegetables, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 13, 2007, at 12; Geraint Smith, Parents
Expected to Outlive Children as Obesity Spreads, EVENING STANDARD, Sept. 9,
2002, at 15.
23. See Steven Cummins et al., Large Scale Food Retailing as an Intervention for
Diet and Health: Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of a Natural Experiment, 59 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY COMMUNITY HEALTH 1035 (2005) (providing a literature review of
early studies).
24. Martin Wainwright, Fresh Fruit and Veg Herald a Fresh Start for the Corner
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
1,
1999),
Stop,
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/apr/02/martinwainwright
[https://perma.cc/8KSF-LN6Q].
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store pilot program garnered positive press, supermarkets were the
main beneficiaries of the push to expand food retail options. In late
1999, for example, large grocery chain Tesco announced a partnership
with Blair’s “New Deal” welfare to work program to create two
thousand jobs by building new stores in food deserts,25 which became
part of Tesco’s broader strategy to expand in low-income and
depressed areas through “regeneration partnerships” with local
organizations and authorities.26 Tesco’s promise to revitalize food
deserts helped propel its rapid growth: between 1990 and 2005 its
market share in the United Kingdom nearly doubled, jumping from
sixteen to thirty percent.27
B.

The Emergence of Food Access in the United States

In the 1990s, researchers and policymakers in the United States
increasingly focused on the ability of individuals to purchase food
through conventional distribution channels.28 Although activist
groups had addressed hunger and malnourishment for decades,29
advocates in the United States increased their efforts to improve food
access. Government cuts to welfare and food assistance programs, as
well as economic restructuring, had rapidly increased food
insecurity.30 The rise in food insecure populations consequently

25. Lucy Baker, Tesco in Partnership Deal to Create 2,000 Jobs in Most Deprived
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
18,
1999),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/tesco-in-partnership-deal-tocreate-2000-jobs-in-most-deprived-areas-740510.html
[https://perma.cc/V8Q2UC3Q].
26. See Steven Cummins et al., Healthy Cities: The Impact of Food Retail-Led
Regeneration on Food Access, Choice and Retail Structure, 31 BUILT ENV’T. 288, 289
(2005) (describing Tesco’s “particularly active” ‘regeneration’ strategy); see also
Judith Nelson, See How Our Regeneration Partnership Scheme Helps People Back
into Work, TESCO (Mar. 29, 2012), https://www.ourtesco.com/2012/03/29/946/
[https://perma.cc/8NPV-4BAK] (advertising the opening of Tesco’s forty-second
“Regeneration Partnership” store since 2000).
27. See U.K. % Market Share of Supermarkets - Groceries Market,
[hereinafter
U.K.
Market
Share],
FOODDESERTS.ORG
http://www.fooddeserts.org/images/supshare.htm [https://perma.cc/EFQ8-329Q].
28. See, e.g., Barbara E. Cohen, Food Security and Hunger Policy for the 1990s,
25 NUTRITION TODAY 23, 25 (1990).
29. See, e.g., GARRET BROAD, MORE THAN JUST FOOD: FOOD JUSTICE AND
COMMUNITY CHANGE 131–46 (2016) (discussing the Black Panther Party’s food
programs); Janet Poppendieck, Hunger in America: Typification and Response, in
EATING AGENDAS: FOOD AND NUTRITION AS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 11–34 (Donna
Maurer & Jeffery Sobal eds., 1995) (analyzing “discoveries” of hunger in the United
States during the 1930s, 1960s, and 1980s).
30. See Saskia Sassen, Economic Restructuring and the American City, 16 ANN.
REV. SOC. 465, 466–67 (1990).

Areas,
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overwhelmed the nation’s emergency food system.31 At the same
time, the migration of supermarkets and grocery stores away from
low-income neighborhoods often made acquiring affordable food
difficult for the urban poor.32 Newly emerging social movements,
including the community food security and environmental justice
movements, integrated the concept of food access into their own
agendas and activism.33 In reports, academic articles, and advocacy
materials, members of these movements broadened the notion to
encompass equity and the entire food supply chain.34 Nonetheless,
the policies and programs that emerged to improve access often used
the narrower definition of food access that highlighted the availability
of conventional food retail.35
This limited definition appealed to urban policymakers and public
health officials because it framed the problem of food insecurity and
diet-related health disparities as a market failure that could be cured
through policy interventions such as subsidies to for-profit food
retailers.36 Access quickly came to be defined by “the presence of
conventional food markets in low-income neighborhoods or close
by.”37
It was not until the early 2000s, however, that U.S.
organizations and researchers, following the U.K. model, began to
systematically “document” food deserts and advocate for additional
food retail.

31. Between 1970 and 1986, the purchasing power of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (“AFDC”), the federal government’s main welfare program,
declined by thirty-three percent. STAFF OF COMM. ON HUNGER, 100TH CONG.,
OBTAINING FOOD: SHOPPING CONSTRAINTS ON THE POOR 2 (Comm. Print 1987). The
amount of food distributed through the emergency food system increased from 25
million pounds in 1979 to over 450 million pounds in 1990. LINDA ASHMAN ET AL.,
SEEDS OF CHANGE: STRATEGIES FOR FOOD SECURITY FOR THE INNER CITY 15 (1993).
32. See STAFF OF COMM. ON HUNGER, supra note 31, at 4.
33. See Robert Gottlieb & Andrew Fisher, “First Feed the Face”: Environmental
Justice and Community Food Security, 28 ANTIPODE 193, 193 (1996); ROBERT
GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 16–18 (rev. ed. 2005).
34. See Gottlieb & Fisher, supra note 33, at 200.
35. See, e.g., Renee E. Walker et al., Disparities and Access to Healthy Food in
the United States: A Review of Food Deserts Literature, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 876,
876 (2010).
36. The fact that supermarkets, for example, inaccurately gauged market demand
was emphasized. Id. at 877.
37. Cohen, supra note 28, at 25.
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Municipal Politics and Food Access

Food access became politically salient in cities as elected officials,
urban “growth coalitions,”38 the food retail sector, urban planners,
and public health practitioners sought to reverse the loss of
conventional food retailers from cities.39 Over the past century,
policies of residential discrimination and segregation, bank redlining,
urban renewal, federal highway construction, and federal housing
policies prompted disinvestment in communities of color,
exacerbating wealth inequality by shifting dollars to more affluent,
white suburban communities.40 These policies facilitated the shift of
chain supermarkets to the suburbs, and by underwriting the flight of
middle class and affluent white residents from cities, led to the decline
of the independent grocers that remained.41 In the 1970s, low income
zip codes had more supermarkets than high income zip codes, but by
the 1980s and 1990s this ratio had been reversed.42 Between 1970 and
1988, Los Angeles, Chicago, and the New York City boroughs of
Manhattan and Brooklyn lost half of their large grocery stores.43
By the 1980s, however, cities began to reinvest in neighborhoods
that had been neglected for decades. City administrations and real
estate developers recognized that new middle and high income
residential projects depended on the presence of supermarkets (along
with refurbished playgrounds, schools, and other amenities) to attract
the affluent residents who were being enticed to move into (and
gentrify) low-income neighborhoods, and that tax revenue was being
lost as city residents spent food dollars in adjacent suburbs.44 By the
38. See generally Harvey Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a
Political Economy of Place, 82 AM. J. SOC. 309 (1976).
39. See generally Kameshwari Pothukuchi, Attracting Supermarkets to Inner-City
Neighborhoods: Economic Development Outside the Box, 19 ECON. DEV. Q. 232

(2005).
40. See generally REBUILDING URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS: ACHIEVEMENTS,
OPPORTUNITIES, AND LIMITS (W. Dennis Keating & Norman Krumholz eds., 1999);
David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of
Racism and Discrimination, 896 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 173 (1999).
41. Elizabeth Eisenhauer, In Poor Health: Supermarket Redlining and Urban
Nutrition, 53 GEOJOURNAL 125, 126–27 (2001); Pothukuchi, supra note 39.
42. Jarrett Thibodeaux, A Historical Era of Food Deserts: Changes in the
Correlates of Urban Supermarket Location, 1970–1990, 3 SOC. CURRENTS 186, 188,
196–97 (2015).
43. Marilyn Lavin, Supermarket Access and Consumer Well-Being: The Case of
Pathmark in Harlem, 33 INT’L J. RETAIL & DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 388, 388 (2005).
44. See generally NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND
THE REVANCHIST CITY (1996). National retail and real estate studies provided
evidence to support policies to attract food retail to cities by documenting unmet
grocery demand and the “leakage” of inner-city food dollars to suburban stores. See
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1990s, food retailers that had saturated suburban markets in the 1970s
viewed cities as new business frontiers.45 Seizing this market
opportunity, retailers reconfigured their business models and physical
layouts to fit smaller spaces in gentrifying neighborhoods, often with
the support of municipal officials.46
D. Food Access and the “Obesity Epidemic”
Food access was also positioned as a solution to the rising incidence
of obesity, which was described in a 1985 report of the National
Institutes of Health as a major public health threat.47 By 2001, the
Surgeon General issued a “call to action” to decrease the incidence of
overweight and obesity, which he said had reached “nationwide
epidemic proportions.”48
Attention to obesity led academics,
advocates, and policymakers to focus on measuring the problem, its
causes, and potential solutions. Research in public health and urban
planning examined the relationship between food access and
obesity.49 Aided by the wider availability of mapping software and
increasing popularity of geospatial analysis, this research caused a
proliferation of studies suggesting that the lack of healthy food was
associated with obesity and diet-related diseases.50 The focus on food
access coincided with a shift in public health towards framing the
causes of obesity as the result of environmental factors, such as
marketing practices and unhealthy food environments, rather than
personal behavior and biology.51
Food access captured the
imagination of progressive planners and public health practitioners in
large part because it addressed food insecurity through a social
ecological model emphasizing the neighborhood environment,
including the physical availability of food retailers.52 It also appeared
also Michael E. Porter, New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development, 11

ECON. DEV. Q. 11, 14 (1997).
45. Porter, supra note 44, at 14.
46. See Pothukuchi, supra note 39, at 234; Betsy Donald, Food Retail and Access
After the Crash: Rethinking the Food Desert Problem, 13 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 231,
235 (2013).
47. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF OBESITY 7 (1985).
48. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO
PREVENT ACTION AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, at v (2001).
49. Jerry Shannon, Food Deserts: Governing Obesity in the Neoliberal City,
38 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 248, 248–66 (2014).
50. Id. at 248–55.
51. Regina G. Lawrence, Framing Obesity: The Evolution of News Discourse on
a Public Health Issue 56–75 (Harvard Int’l J. Press/Politics, Working Paper No. 20045, 2004).
52. See Shannon, supra note 49, at 255.
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to offer a politically feasible solution to a long-running problem. The
idea that government, working hand-in-hand with industry, could
address diet-related health disparities through the expansion of retail
grocery stores resonated in an era when policymakers increasingly
viewed well-managed economic markets as the solution to social
problems—and sought to transform the poor into “[self-reliant]
market actors.”53
II. FOOD ACCESS POLICIES
Federal, state, and local governments in the United States have
long implemented a wide range of policies to provide access to food,
from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) to
school food, congregate meal programs for seniors, support for food
pantries and emergency feeding programs, and other food assistance
programs. Governments have also facilitated various forms of private
sector food retail access, from building public markets for food
vendors during the Progressive Era to creating farmers’ markets in
the 1970s.54 Most cities in the United States regulate grocers through
zoning, building codes, and health regulations, and have used direct
subsidies, publicly owned land, tax abatements, and zoning incentives
to attract supermarkets.55 For much of the last century, however,
urban planners and policymakers have considered food retail to be
market driven and did not seek to directly subsidize grocers.56 This
laissez-faire approach began to change in the 1990s as a result of
several efforts to support the development of conventional food
retailers in low-income communities. It was not until the 2000s,
however, that the new food access paradigm led to widespread policy
change. The perceived success of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food
Financing Initiative, a public-private partnership started in 2004 to
expand food retail in food deserts,57 as well as earlier developments in
the United Kingdom, spurred substantial interest in retail-focused
food access interventions among U.S. policymakers, philanthropists,
and researchers.
53. See JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE
AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 22 (2011).

POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM

54. Gregory A. Donofrio, Feeding the City, 7 GASTRONOMICA 30, 35–39 (2007).
55. Pothukuchi, supra note 39, at 232.
56. See Kameshwari Pothukuchi & Jerome L. Kaufman, Placing the Food System
on the Urban Agenda: The Role of Municipal Institutions in Food Systems Planning,
16 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 213, 213–24 (1999).
57. See, e.g., Allison Karpyn et al., Policy Solutions to the ‘Grocery Gap,’ 29
HEALTH AFF. 473, 473–80 (2010) (describing the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Initiative
as a model for other state and national programs).
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A. The Retail Initiative
The Retail Initiative, an early effort to address food access
concerns, was led by the Local Initiative Support Corporation
(“LISC”), a national non-profit primarily involved in helping
communities build affordable housing and commercial developments.
In 1994, LISC created a $24 million fund financed by ten large
financial institutions to help community organizations in major U.S.
cities develop supermarkets in underserved neighborhoods.58 The
initiative’s first project was to invest $1.5 million, along with $1.1
million in public money and below-market city land, to build a largescale Pathmark supermarket in East Harlem, New York.59
B.

State and Local Fresh Food Financing Initiatives

Most large programs to finance new supermarkets in low-income
communities have been organized at the state level. Expanding on
the work of The Retail Initiative, in 2001, The Food Trust of
Philadelphia advocated for improving supermarket access in lowincome Philadelphia communities, which the Philadelphia City
Council responded to with the creation of a Food Marketing Task
Force to address the insufficient number of supermarkets.60 This
effort, in turn, led to a statewide supermarket campaign and the
creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative in 2004
to use New Market Tax Credits and philanthropic financing to
incentivize supermarket developers to locate their stores in lowincome neighborhoods.61 Between 2004 and 2010, the Pennsylvania
Fresh Food Financing Initiative provided $145 million in loans and
grants to support eighty-eight food retail projects.62 The Food Trust
eventually promoted its financing initiative outside of Pennsylvania,
leading to the creation of similar programs in other states, including
Ohio, Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York.63 These efforts
58. Marilyn Lavin, Problems and Opportunities of Retailing in the US “Inner
City,” 7 J. RETAILING & CONSUMER SERVS. 47, 54 (2000).
59. Id.
60. Tracey Giang et al., Closing the Grocery Gap in Underserved Communities:
The Creation of the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, 14 J. PUB.

HEALTH MGMT. & PRACTICE 272, 274 (2008).
61. See Karpyn et al., supra note 57, at 479–80.
62. THE FOOD TRUST, supra note 1, at 2.
63. Healthy Food Financing Programs Across the Country, FOOD TRUST,
http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/media_items/healthy-food-financing-programstable.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3RX-VUS6]. See generally Laura Wolf-Powers,
Food Deserts and Real-Estate-Led Social Policy, 41 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES.
414 (2017).
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also led to municipal policies in cities like New Orleans and New
York City to provide financial and zoning incentives to spur
supermarket development.64
C.

Federal Healthy Food Financing Initiative

The proliferation of state and local healthy food financing
initiatives encouraged President Obama to create a federal version of
the Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative in 2010, called the
Healthy Food Financing Initiative (“HFFI”), which was subsequently
included in the 2014 Farm Bill.65 In addition to bolstering his
administration’s efforts to improve nutrition and reduce obesity,
HFFI was designed to spur local economic development in the wake
of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.66 Like the state financing
initiatives, the federal program supported the development and
expansion of supermarkets and other full service grocery stores in
low-income neighborhoods under-served by food retailers,
distributing more than $500 million in new and existing funds from
the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture (“USDA”) and Health and
Human Services (“HHS”).67 The HFFI, combined with state and
local programs, has supported approximately 126 new supermarket
projects.68
D. Advocacy, Philanthropic, and Research Support
Healthy food financing policies spread rapidly in large part due to
the efforts of advocacy organizations, funders, and academics. The
Pennsylvania Food Financing Initiative, for example, was developed
with a broad coalition of advocates, public health officials, and private
and non-profit development interests.69
Think tanks such as
PolicyLink issued reports describing both the dearth of supermarkets

64. SARAH TREUHAFT & ALLISON KARPYN, THE GROCERY GAP: WHO HAS
ACCESS TO HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS, POLICYLINK & THE FOOD TRUST
22 (2010).
65. Wolf-Powers, supra note 63, at 418; see also 7 U.S.C.A. § 6953 (West 2017).
66. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 1 (noting that the initiative was part of
a broader effort by the administration to promote economic recovery).
67. Elbel et al., supra note 2, at 2882; see also Heather Tirado Gilligan, Food
Deserts Aren’t the Problem, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/
food/2014/02/food_deserts_and_fresh_food_access_aren_t_the_problem_poverty_not
_obesity.html [https://perma.cc/Q6V8-RZJS] (examining HFFI’s effectiveness).
68. Benjamin W. Chrisinger, Taking Stock of New Supermarkets in Food Deserts:
Patterns in Development, Financing, and Health Promotion 1, 4–5 (Fed. Res. Bank
of S.F., Working Paper 2016-04).
69. Giang et al., supra note 60, at 272.
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in low-income communities and the connection between insufficient
food retail and diet-related diseases.70
Philanthropic organizations also supported these initiatives by
underwriting incentive programs and the evaluation of their impacts.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, for example, invested $12
million in New Jersey’s Food Access Initiative.71 The Kellogg
Foundation provided $3 million in partnership with NCB Capital
Impact to fund several food access ventures.72 The California
Endowment made a $30 million investment in the California
FreshWorks Fund to finance healthy food retailers.73
The
Reinvestment Fund created a $120 million financing program for
fresh food retail establishments.74 This philanthropic and advocacy
support helped to reinforce the link between supermarkets and food
access, nutrition, and health.
Government and academic research was also instrumental in
framing the issue of malnourishment and obesity in terms of retail
food access by generating data that policymakers used to design and
implement food access programs. For example, in the 2008 Farm Bill,
Congress required the USDA to study the causes, effects, and
strategies to eliminate food deserts that included “incentives for retail
food market development, including supermarkets, small grocery
stores, and farmers’ markets . . . .”75 Despite raising questions about
the use of supermarkets and proximity as measures of access,76 the
USDA nevertheless created an online Food Access Research Atlas
that defined food deserts as areas lacking full-service food retailers,
framing the problem of food access in terms of the spatial distribution
of supermarkets.77
70. Karpyn et al., supra note 57, at 473.
71. Philanthropy News Digest, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Pledges $12
Million to New Jersey Food Access Initiative (Apr. 2, 2012),
https://philanthropynewsdigest.org/news/robert-wood-johnson-foundation-pledges12-million-to-new-jersey-food-access-initiative [https://perma.cc/C68U-PKU3].
72. Grantwatch, Foundations Aim to Foster Nourishment and Banish ‘Food
Deserts’, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1119, 1119–1120 (2012).
73. Id.
74. IRA GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE REINVESTMENT FUND, CDFI FINANCING OF
SUPERMARKETS IN UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES: A CASE STUDY 5 (2008).
75. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 7527,
122 Stat. 1278.
76. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE AND
NUTRITIOUS FOOD: MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING FOOD DESERTS AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES 28 tbl.2.7 (2009), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/
42711/12716_ap036_1_.pdf?v=41055 [https://perma.cc/5UUE-EQDD].
77. “[L]ow access to healthy food is defined as being far from a supermarket,
supercenter, or large grocery store (‘supermarket’ for short).” Documentation, U.S.

2018]

LET THEM EAT KALE

1105

The federal government funded additional food access research
and planning through the Communities Putting Prevention to Work
national grant program (“CPPW”). This program was administered
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and in
2010 provided over $400 million to fifty communities, including many
large cities, to implement “policy, systems, and environmental”
interventions to reduce obesity and diet-related health problems.78
Many of these grants financed food systems research and planning
projects that focused attention on increasing access to healthier food,
and approximately half of the grant recipients developed
interventions to enhance access to healthy food retail or healthier
retail food.79
Academic researchers have continued to focus on the geospatial
distribution of food retailers, attempting to find associations between
access and health outcomes. Many of these studies have analyzed
spatial disparities in access to healthy food and how these disparities
could affect an individual’s health.80 Much of this food access
research has attempted to measure the impacts of food deserts on
diet-related diseases and the effects of new food retailers on food
choices and health outcomes.81 This research has typically analyzed
the proximity and density of “retail food outlets” in communities,
frequently using supermarkets as proxies for access to healthy,
affordable food.82 In supporting and carrying out this research,
funders and academics have helped to perpetuate the theory that
access to supermarkets is a critical factor in health disparities.
As this section has shown, local, state, and federal policies have
been implemented to support the development of new supermarkets
based on assumptions that they improve access to healthy food and
thus address malnourishment and diet-related diseases. The narrative
underlying such policies—that communities with insufficient food
retail will become healthier as a result of new supermarkets—has

DEP’T AGRIC., ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/foodaccess-research-atlas/documentation [https://perma.cc/S4ZC-ZE6P].
78. Rebecca Bunnell et al., Fifty Communities Putting Prevention to Work:

Accelerating Chronic Disease Prevention Through Policy, Systems and
Environmental Change, 37 J. COMMUNITY HEALTH 1081, 1081–82 (2012).
79. Id. For example, Cook County, Illinois used these funds to create a program
to encourage corner stores to sell healthier food. See Latetia Moore, Supporting
Healthful Eating Through Retail Environmental Change: Communities Putting
Prevention to Work, 10 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, No. E189, Nov. 2013, at 2.
80. Shannon, supra note 49, at 248.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 255.
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been reinforced by food advocates, philanthropic organizations, the
USDA, and research aimed at testing this relationship. However, as
the following section illustrates, researchers have found little
empirical evidence to support the theory that new supermarkets lead
to improved health.
III. LIMITATIONS OF RETAIL FOOD ACCESS POLICIES
When the Blair government first popularized the phrase “food
desert” in the late 1990s and claimed, prematurely, that food deserts
were responsible for major health disparities, research on the effects
of food access in advanced economies was in its infancy. Early
research suggested a link between proximity to food retailers and
healthier eating, and advocates for food access interventions
summarized these studies to support supermarket incentive
programs.83 A 2013 report by PolicyLink and the Food Trust, for
example, asserted that “[l]iving closer to healthy food retail is
associated with better eating habits and decreased risk for obesity and
diet-related diseases.”84
However, more recent research suggests that there is little to no
relationship between proximity to retailers of healthy food and
increased purchasing or consumption of healthy food.85 A 2016 study
using store-level sales data not only looked at whether people lived
near retail food stores, but also tracked what products those stores
carried and what store customers purchased.86 The study, which was
the first of its kind, found that physical proximity to retail food stores
with nutritious food accounted for less than 3% of the nutrition gap
between low-income and high-income households.87 A systematic
review of forty-two studies of retail grocery store interventions
designed to promote healthier food consumption, including
interventions that coupled new food retail with programs like

83. See, e.g., JUDITH BELL ET AL., POLICYLINK & THE FOOD TRUST, ACCESS TO
HEALTHY FOOD AND WHY IT MATTERS: A REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 4 (2013).
84. Id. at 12.
85. Steven Cummins et al., New Neighborhood Grocery Store Increased
Awareness of Food Access but Did Not Alter Dietary Habits or Obesity, 33 HEALTH
AFF. 283, 283 (2017); Tamara Dubowitz et al., Diet and Perceptions Change with
Supermarket Introduction in a Food Desert, but Not Because of Supermarket Use,
34 HEALTH AFF. 1858, 1858 (2015).
86. Jessie Handbury, Is the Focus on Food Deserts Fruitless? Retail Access and
Food Purchases Across the Socioeconomic Spectrum 1, 5–7 (Becker Friedman Inst.
Working Paper, No. 2016-08, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2854329 [https://perma.cc/5V56-WFLB].
87. Id. at 38.
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nutrition education and discounts for fruits and vegetables, found
mixed results.88 A review of fifty-one studies examining the
relationship between obesity and the presence of food retailers,
proximity to stores, and the number and types of stores within given
areas, found that only 32% of associations were in the expected
direction, 10% were in the opposite direction, and 58% showed no
association.89 Furthermore, recent studies measuring the impact of a
new supermarket on residents of underserved communities have also
shown no significant change in food buying or eating patterns.90 For
example, while a new supermarket in Philadelphia, financed by the
Pennsylvania Fresh Food Financing Initiative, improved residents’
perceptions of food access, it did not lead to reported increased
consumption of fruits and vegetables or decreases in body mass
indexes.91 A quasi-experimental study in Pittsburgh found similar
results: significant improvements in perceptions of healthy food
access but no significant changes in food buying practices.92 Another
study found that a year after the opening of a new supermarket in an
underserved South Bronx neighborhood, residents reported no
significant change in fruit or vegetable consumption or overall dietary
quality compared to a control community.93 These studies indicate
that new supermarkets may improve perceptions of healthy food
access but do not appear to change shopping and buying practices,
and that supermarkets, which sell both unhealthy and healthy
products, do not necessarily change the balance of unhealthy and
healthy items purchased and consumed. Other studies have found
inconsistent relationships between proximity to supermarkets and
measures of food insecurity.94
88. Abdulfatah Adam & Jørgen Jensen, What is the Effectiveness of Obesity
Related Interventions at Retail Grocery Stores and Supermarkets?—A Systematic
Review, 16 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1247, 1249, 1252–57 (2016).
89. Ryan J. Gamba et al., Measuring the Food Environment and Its Effects on
Obesity in the United States: A Systematic Review of Methods and Results, 40 J.

COMMUNITY HEALTH 464, 468 (2015).
90. See Francine Rodier et al., Food Deserts: Is It Only About a Limited Access?,
119 BRITISH FOOD J. 1495, 1503 (2017); see also Adam Drewnowski et al., Food

Environment and Socioeconomic Status Influence Obesity Rates in Seattle and in
Paris, 38 INT’L J. OBESITY 306, 310 (2014).
91. Cummins et al., supra note 85, at 5.
92. See Madhumita Ghosh-Dastidar et al., Does Opening a Supermarket in a
Food Desert Change the Food Environment?, 46 HEALTH & PLACE 249, 250 (2017).
93. Brian Elbel et al., The Introduction of a Supermarket via Tax-Credits in a
Low-Income Area: The Influence on Purchasing and Consumption, 31 AM. J.

HEALTH PROMOTION 59, 59 (2015).
94. Compare Andrea S. Richardson et al., Can the Introduction of a Full-Service
Supermarket in a Food Desert Improve Residents’ Economic Status and Health?, 27
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While the majority of high-quality studies examining the
relationship between healthy food retail and health outcomes have
not found an association between the two, proponents of food access
interventions nonetheless continue to rely on the minority of studies
showing such a connection.95 This has important policy implications.
As long as governments and activists continue to assert that access to
food retail is a determinant of healthy food purchasing, diets, and
health, initiatives to address the financial and logistical obstacles to
healthy food consumption will be more difficult to advance. The food
access narrative persists—despite increasing evidence to the
contrary—for several reasons outlined in the following section.
IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF RETAIL FOOD ACCESS POLICIES
National food access programs like the Healthy Food Financing
Initiative and local policies like New York City’s Food Retail
Expansion to Support Health still retain considerable support. In
fact, many policymakers and nonprofit organizations continue to
advocate for more aggressive funding for food retail-focused
interventions. A bipartisan group of four U.S. senators, for example,
introduced a bill in 2017,96 which they claimed would “target food
deserts by incentivizing food service providers . . . to help eradicate
these areas.”97 The bill, dubbed the Healthy Food Access for All
Americans Act, was endorsed by a wide range of groups, including
Feeding America, the Food Trust, the American Diabetes
Association, Environmental Working Group, the National Grocers
Association, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors.98 Three factors help
explain the appeal of such interventions despite overwhelming
evidence that they fail to improve health or dietary outcomes: selfpromotion by food retailers, the political appeal of supermarket
development, and analytical weaknesses.

ANN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 771, 771 (2017), with Scott W. Allard et al., Neighborhood
Food Infrastructure and Food Security in Metropolitan Detroit, 51 J. CONSUMER

AFF. 566, 566 (2017).
95. See, e.g., BELL ET AL., supra note 83, at 12; see also Cummins et al., supra note
85, at 284.
96. The Healthy Food Access for All Americans Act, S. 1724, 115th Cong. (2017).
97. Press Release, Senator Mark Warren, Sens. Warner, Moran Introduce First
Comprehensive Senate Bill to Encourage Food Service Providers to Help Eradicate
Food Deserts (Aug. 3, 2017) (on file with authors).
98. Id.
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A. Self-Promotion by Food Retailers
The supermarket industry, long criticized for price-gouging lowincome consumers and abandoning cities for the suburbs, successfully
repositioned itself as key to urban revitalization and community
health in the 1990s and early 2000s. The industry portrayed itself as
ready and able to open new, redesigned, small-footprint grocery
stores in underserved communities at a scale that independent grocers
could not match, enabling these chains to secure public subsidies.99
Tesco, for example, the fastest growing food retailer in terms of
market share in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2005 (nearly
doubling its market share from approximately sixteen percent to
approximately thirty percent),100 capitalized on concerns about food
deserts to garner positive press and win over government officials. As
discussed above, the company announced a partnership with Blair’s
“New Deal” welfare-to-work program in 1999 to create two thousand
jobs in new stores in “towns that were previously labelled ‘food
deserts.’”101 By investing in “inner cities and industrial towns” with
limited retail food options, Tesco promised to regenerate poor
neighborhoods while bringing jobs and food to areas which had
previously been known as food deserts.102 Tesco was also able to
deflect criticism that its stores (which, like Walmart, carry a variety of
non-food products), would put locally-owned, independent shops out
of business by emphasizing the benefits they would create by
increasing food access.103
When Tesco expanded to the United States in 2006, they seized on
food access as their primary public relations strategy, telling
99. See generally Karina Christiansen, Reframing “Food Deserts”: The History of
Urban Supermarket Access and Its Public Policy Discourse (Aug. 2016) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University) (on file with authors).
100. See U.K. Market Share, supra note 27.
101. Baker, supra note 25. In 2015, Tesco articulated a plan that would plausibly
lead to the chain closing or abandoning nearly one hundred stores in the United
Kingdom. Zoe Wood, Tesco Chief Unveils Dramatic Shakeup at Troubled
Supermarket, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/
jan/08/tesco-chief-unveils-dramatic-shake-up-troubled-supermarket [https://perma.cc/
AGB2-QAWW]. It is unclear how many of these abandoned or closed stores were in
locations with limited retail food options. See Tesco Names 43 UK Store Closures,
BBC (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31023136 [https://perma.cc/
ZFE7-KLSU].
102. See Baker, supra note 25.
103. Tesco CEO Sir Terry Leahy responded to such criticism by stating,
“Government and other people were wringing their hands [about food deserts.]
Tesco came up with a perfect solution. It’s a surprise that the perfect solution
prompted so much criticism.” SARAH RYLE, THE MAKING OF TESCO: A STORY OF
BRITISH SHOPPING 244–45 (2013).
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journalists, politicians, and the public that their new chain, Fresh &
Easy, would bring fresh food and groceries to food deserts, leading to
news headlines like “Tesco launch stirs high hopes in U.S. ‘food
deserts.’”104 Tesco’s head of operations in the United States, Tim
Mason, told the Observer, “[o]ne of the reasons we appeal to
American politicians is because we have said we will go back into
neighborhoods that have become ‘food deserts.’”105 Yet despite
Tesco’s pledge, only ten of its first ninety-eight U.S. stores were
located in areas where the poverty rate was significantly higher than
that of the relevant county (notably, the data indicates that Tesco
“has generally established its sites in areas with greater rather than
lesser food security”).106 In fact, at the outset, Tesco focused on
“middle-income customers and suburban locations” with a
comparable “store size, price, and to a certain extent product mix” as
Trader Joe’s.107 Even if Fresh & Easy stores had opened in food
deserts, their presence would likely have been short-lived: Tesco
announced that it was withdrawing from the U.S. market in 2012, and
the last Fresh & Easy was scheduled to close in 2015.108
Like Tesco, Walmart, which relied on physically large “big box”
retail stores since its inception, saw a business opportunity in smallformat urban and small town stores to address saturation in existing
locations. In August 2008, Walmart created a new small-format store,
which it branded “Marketside,” to compete primarily with Fresh &
Easy.109 Walmart closed its four Marketside stores just three years
later, announcing the creation of another small-store format called
Walmart Express.110 In 2011, Walmart experienced one of its worst
104. Tim Gaynor, Tesco Launch Stirs High Hopes in U.S. “Food Deserts”,
REUTERS (Aug. 21, 2007), https://www.reuters.com/article/businesspro-retail-usatesco-dc/tesco-launch-stirs-high-hopes-in-u-s-food-deserts-idUSN2128683620070822?
pageNumber=1 [https://perma.cc/E5KT-N6BC].
105. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB & ANUPAMA JOSHI, FOOD JUSTICE 50 (2010).
106. AMANDA SHAFFER ET AL., URBAN & ENVT’L POL’Y INST., SHOPPING FOR A
MARKET: EVALUATING TESCO’S ENTRY INTO LOS ANGELES AND THE UNITED STATES
31 (2007).
107. GOTTLIEB & JOSHI, supra note 105, at 50.
108. Julia Finch & Fiona Walsh, Tesco’s American Dream Over as US Retreat
Confirmed, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/
dec/05/tesco-american-dream-retreat-us-fresh-easy [https://perma.cc/2YUT-ZZAG];
Shan Li, Billionaire Investor Ron Burkle Says Bankrupt Fresh & Easy ‘Was in a Free
Fall’, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ron-burkleyucaipa-fresh-easy-20151107-story.html [https://perma.cc/6F4S-NG87].
109. Alessandro Bonanno, An Empirical Investigation of Wal-Mart’s Expansion
into Food Retailing, 26 AGRIBUSINESS 220, 239 (2010).
110. See Max Jarman, Walmart Closes Its 4 Marketside Stores in Phoenix Area,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Oct. 16, 2011), http://archive.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/
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slumps in U.S. sales.111 That year, Walmart promised that Walmart
Express would allow the retailer to expand into urban areas and rural
towns that couldn’t support larger stores, and would therefore
increase access to healthy food.112
The month following the opening of the first Walmart Express in
Gentry, Arkansas, First Lady Michelle Obama announced a plan by
Walmart, along with Walgreens, SuperValu, and three regional
chains, to open or expand 1500 stores in food deserts across the
country.113 The supermarket and pharmacy chains received positive
press for this agreement, yet there was little to no news coverage
when they failed to meet their commitments.114 A 2013 investigation
found that Walgreens still needed to build or convert about 900 of the
stores they had committed to build or renovate in food deserts.115 In
2015, Walgreens claimed that it had started to offer fruits and
vegetables in 300 stores “in or around food deserts,” but this claim
was never independently evaluated and the chain never revealed if it
had made any additional progress.116 While Walmart claimed to open
or renovate 392 stores in or around food deserts by 2016, exceeding
business/articles/2011/10/16/20111016biz-walmart1016.html [https://perma.cc/4EN9K74E].
111. See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart Tries to Recapture Mr. Sam’s Winning
Formula, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703803904576152753111788930 [https://perma.cc/U4SM-432Q].
112. See Allison Lin, Walmart, Other Big Boxes Try Small Boxes, MSNBC (June
6, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43414111/ns/business-retail/t/wal-mart-otherbig-boxes-try-out-smaller-boxes/#.Wlbda1Q-eU0 [https://perma.cc/TAX8-5KWT].
113. Bridget Huber, Walmart’s Fresh Food Makeover, NATION (Sept. 14, 2011),
https://www.thenation.com/article/walmarts-fresh-food-makeover/ [https://perma.cc/
P8VH-3T98]; Alissa Skelton, Wal-Mart to Test Small Store Format, N.Y. TIMES
(June
2,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/business/03walmart.html
[https://nyti.ms/2HisnYR].
114. See, e.g., Yian Q. Mui, First Lady, Grocers Vow to Build Stores in ‘Food
Deserts’, WASH. POST (July 20, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/first-lady-grocers-vow-to-build-stores-in-food-deserts/2011/07/20/gIQA9LH
RQI_story.html?utm_term=.144f25b6cf11 [https://perma.cc/527T-WUV7]; Jessica
Wohl, Chains and Michelle Obama Team on “Food Deserts”, REUTERS (July 20,
2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grocers-whitehouse/chains-and-michelleobama-team-on-food-desert-stores-idUSTRE76J5S420110720 [https://perma.cc/8W
BA-JM4T]; Press Release, Walmart, First Lady Michelle Obama Celebrates
Walmart’s Progress on Making Food Healthier and More Affordable (Feb. 28, 2013)
(on file with author) (providing helpful context to the proposition which the
published news stories more directly support).
115. See Brigid Sweeney, Walgreen’s Unmet Promise (So Far) in Food Deserts,
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (July 12, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140712/
ISSUE01/307129981/walgreens-unmet-promise-so-far-in-food-deserts
[https://perma.cc/R5EZ-4G3P].
116. See P’SHIP FOR A HEALTHIER AM., IN IT FOR GOOD: 2015 ANNUAL PROGRESS
REPORT 76 (2015).
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its commitment by 117 stores,117 it abandoned its Express concept
later that year, closing 154 stores in the United States, many of them
in food deserts.118
B.

Political Appeal of Supermarket Development

New supermarkets are politically appealing to city elected officials
attempting to increase residential development in low-income
communities because they are favored by developers and more
affluent residents. In justifying New York City’s FRESH initiative,
for example, the former New York City Planning Commissioner
stressed the importance of supermarkets to the city’s redevelopment
plans, claiming:
If you’re thinking of moving your family to the Lower Concourse [a
large manufacturing area in the South Bronx that the commission
rezoned to include residential buildings] you’re going to say, like,
“Wow, there is no grocery store here. I’m not going to move
here.”119

Community organizations, food policy councils, non-profit
development groups, and labor unions also often lobby for new
supermarkets.120 With the exception of chain retailers like Walmart
that are perceived to unfairly compete with existing locally owned
businesses and depress wages, supermarkets are often well-received
by residents, the business and development communities, labor
unions, and other stakeholders.121 For example, in New York City,
residents of East Harlem, a predominantly low-income Latino and
African American neighborhood, waged a multi-year advocacy

117. PARTNERSHIP FOR A HEALTHIER AMERICA, IN IT FOR GOOD: 2016 ANNUAL
PROGRESS REPORT 29 (2016).
118. Sarah Halzack, Walmart Is Ending Its Express Concept and Closing 269
Stores, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2016/01/15/walmart-is-ending-its-express-concept-and-closing-269-stores/
?utm_term=.f99854df2642 [https://perma.cc/TB3Q-DPNB]; see Philip Lucas & Mike
Schneider, Wal-Mart’s Store Closures Create New Food Desert, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Jan. 30, 2016), http://www.columbian.com/news/2016/jan/30/wal-marts-storeclosures-create-new-food-deserts/ [https://perma.cc/TXX9-YC3F].
119. Diane Cardwell, A Plan to Add Supermarkets to Poor Areas, with Healthy
Results, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/nyregion/
24super.html [https://nyti.ms/2lrntdR].
120. See Lavin, supra note 43, at 388.
121. For examples of activism to attract a new supermarket, see generally MARK
WINNE, CLOSING THE FOOD GAP: RESETTING THE TABLE IN THE LAND OF PLENTY
(2008); Lavin, supra note 43.
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campaign to bring a new supermarket to the community.122 In
response, city officials provided land at a below-market price to a
church-based community development company, the Abyssinian
Development Corporation, to open a Pathmark supermarket on the
site for ten years, and as noted above, LISC provided financing.123
Soon after the Pathmark opened, it reported 30,000 customers a
week, and by 2014 sales totaled $64 million.124 Neighborhood
histories might also play a role in generating demand for new
supermarkets, emphasizing the need to address food access through
food retail. For example, in communities that have lost a popular
supermarket, residents often feel a very strong need to replace it, and
that need may be based on concerns about the community’s identity
and its ability to thrive.125 Bringing a new supermarket to a
community enables government officials to promise an easy, even if
unrealistic, fix to the complex problems of poverty, community underinvestment, malnourishment, and health disparities, all of which
require substantial and prolonged government investment.
C.

Analytical Weaknesses

Despite the often-stated goal of evidence-based policymaking,
programs are frequently advanced because they appeal to intuitive
assumptions or models about consumer preferences and decisionmaking that may be untested or simply wrong.126 Simple theories,
such as that living very close to a supermarket that sells healthy food
will cause people to buy more of that food, have intuitive appeal, and
may win out over theories that attempt to address the complexities of
economic decision-making, choice architectures, and the

122. N.Y.C. FOOD POLICY CTR. AT HUNTER COLL., BEYOND PATHMARK:
ASSURING ACCESS TO HEALTHY AFFORDABLE FOOD IN EAST HARLEM 1 (2015).
123. Id.
124. See id. In April 2014, however, the Abyssinian Development Corporation
sold the property for $39 million to Extell Development Corporation. Id. Soon
thereafter, Pathmark’s parent company, A & P Supermarkets, went bankrupt, forcing
it to close the East Harlem store and other supermarkets around the region,
prompting protests from community residents and raising concerns about
supermarket closures throughout New York City. See generally id.
125. See Benjamin W. Chrisinger, If You Build It, Will They Come, and What Will
They Eat? Investigating Supermarket Development in Food Deserts 15 (Jan. 1, 2015)
(unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University
of
Pennsylvania),
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1029 [https://perma.cc/Q54J-CMRE].
126. See generally Crystal C. Hall, Assumptions About Behavior and Choice in
Response to Public Assistance, 1 POL’Y INSIGHTS BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 137 (2014).
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interconnected social practices that drive behaviors like food
shopping, buying, and eating.127
By starting with the assumption that close physical proximity to
healthy food is necessary for healthy eating, food access advocates
have been able to ignore or dismiss studies showing that proximity
has little to no effect on diet.128 Moreover, when studies show that an
intervention has failed to change behavior, policymakers often seek
to redesign the intervention (e.g., adding informational “nudges” to
encourage shoppers to buy healthier food at the supermarket),129
rather than questioning the underlying approach of addressing
malnourishment through increased retail. Researchers also tend to
conduct studies that are feasible to carry out, resulting in the
proliferation of research measuring easy-to-analyze variables, such as
area studies that attempt to associate proximity between population
centroids and food retailers.130 The proliferation of Geographic
Information Systems (“GIS”) tools, and the relative accessibility of
data on poverty and food retail locations, has made it easy to measure
neighborhood-level variables, despite the fact that these studies do
not distinguish where individual households actually shop and what
they choose to purchase.131
127. See generally Nevin Cohen & Kristen Cribbs, The Everyday Food Practices of
Community-Dwelling Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) Older
Adults, 41 J. AGING STUD. 75 (2017).
128. See, e.g., Yael Lehmann, Neighborhood Grocery Stores Combat Obesity and
Improve Food Perceptions, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 12, 2014),

https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140312.037646/full/ [https://perma.cc/
XTA9-P3Y9] (“Do we really believe that people will be able to eat healthfully if they
can’t buy healthy food in their communities?”); see also Tamara Bucher et al.,

Nudging Consumers Towards Healthier Choices: A Systematic Review of Positional
Influences on Food Choice, 115 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 2252, 2253 (2016).
129. See Deborah N. Archer & Tamara Belinfanti, We Built It and They Did Not
Come: Using New Governance Theory in the Fight for Food Justice in Low-Income
Communities of Color, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 307, 312 (arguing “that true access
should include both physical access (in short, proximity) and cultural access (in

short—the availability of grocery stores that feel a part of the community)”); Emily
Broad Leib, All (Food) Politics Is Local: Expanding Food Access Through Local
Government Action, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 323 (2013) (maintaining that
“local input is vital to successfully expand food access”); Evaluating HFFI, FOOD
TRUST, http://thefoodtrust.org/what-we-do/administrative/hffi-impacts/evaluating-hffi
[https://perma.cc/T8X4-AGF4] (asserting the importance of “nutrition education
programs” and “in-store marketing environments” in creating behavioral change).
130. MICHELE VER PLOEG ET AL., ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., BULLETIN
NO. 138, WHERE DO AMERICANS USUALLY SHOP FOR FOOD AND HOW DO THEY
TRAVEL TO GET THERE? INITIAL FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD FOOD
ACQUISITION AND PURCHASE SURVEY 13–15 (2015).
131. See Leslie A. Lytle & Rebeccah L. Sokol, Measures of the Food
Environment: A Systematic Review of the Field, 2007–2015, 44 HEALTH & PLACE
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The existence of contradictory evidence creates uncertainty, which,
combined with diverse research methods, variable data quality, and
different theoretical models, makes interpreting and evaluating
research results difficult. Understanding and properly applying the
results can be especially challenging for legislative staff who may not
have expertise in evaluation research methods and data analysis.
Complexity enables policy proponents to shape the interpretation of
those studies and couch their arguments in the language of evidencebased public health and policymaking. The Food Trust, for example,
asserts that “HFFI policy and efforts to improve food access are
rooted in more than 300 studies published between 1995 and 2013,”132
yet without parsing these studies for reliability and validity, it is
difficult for political decision-makers to evaluate the evidence.
Another barrier is the persistent use by public health practitioners
of downstream interventions (e.g., cooking classes) rather than
upstream interventions that address economic and social disparities.
Even approaches based on socio-ecological models often “drift
downstream” to variables that influence individual behaviors.133 The
notion that behaviors such as food buying, cooking, and eating result
from choices that can be modified through environmental
interventions like a new supermarket has an easily-grasped intuitive
appeal that has been reinforced by the social psychology and
behavioral economics literatures.134 These interventions also gain
political support because they fit neoliberal ideologies, avoid
challenging corporate business models, and sidestep the complexities
of solving social determinants of health like structural racism or
poverty, which have a significant effect on whether and to what extent
people are able to eat healthy food.135 Addressing the upstream, root
18–34 (2017); see also MICHELE VER PLOEG ET AL., ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T
AGRIC., BULLETIN NO. 180, THE INFLUENCE OF FOODSTORE ACCESS ON GROCERY
SHOPPING AND FOOD SPENDING 2 (2017).
132. Evaluating HFFI, supra note 129.
133. Jennie Popay et al., Injustice Is Killing People on a Large Scale—But What Is
to Be Done About It?, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH 148, 148 (2010).
134. See, e.g., Bucher et al., supra note 128, at 2553. The work of a leading
proponent of the “libertarian paternalist” approach to influencing dietary choices,
Brian Wansink, is being reevaluated in response to revelations that he and his coauthors regularly manipulated data to achieve desired results. See, e.g., Stephanie M.
Lee, The Inside Story of How an Ivy League Food Scientist Turned Shoddy Data
into Viral Studies, BUZZFEED (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/
stephaniemlee/brian-wansink-cornell-p-hacking?utm_term=.jqmLO8dWm#.ekk8Va
EwJ [https://perma.cc/8L5N-ZPWP].
135. See, e.g., Fran Baum & Matthew Fisher, Why Behavioural Health Promotion
Endures Despite Its Failure to Reduce Health Inequities, 36 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS
213, 213, 217 (2014); Sara Glasgow & Ted Schrecker, The Double Burden of
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causes of malnourishment, specifically poverty, time constraints,
stress, and other factors, is much more complex and politically
fraught.
The potential consequences of the downstream focus are serious.
If policymakers in housing, planning, economic development, or
social welfare fail to consider the results of their “upstream” policy
decisions on food security or chronic diseases, they may miss
opportunities to maximize the effects of these broader progressive
policies on population health and food system sustainability, or may
not recognize and take steps to avoid unintended negative
consequences to the food system.136 They may also overlook the
potential for interventions in the food system—from universal school
lunch to food cooperatives—to play a role in alleviating upstream
concerns about economic and social inequality.
Intervening
downstream to change behaviors or improve neighborhood food
environments may narrowly benefit a particular population, but the
effects, if any, may be more limited in scale, scope, and duration than
if policies are focused on class, race, or gender oppression.137
V. UPSTREAM ALTERNATIVES
Public health debates remain focused on downstream issues at both
the national and local levels.138 However, over the past decade, a
number of U.S. cities have responded to widening inequality and
structural racism by adopting political agendas that emphasize
equality and social justice. They have taken steps to increase wages
and improve working conditions, address the high cost of housing,
provide better public services to low-income residents, and address
structural racism.139 These interventions target macro-scale factors
like wealth, education, social capital, and security that are the primary
causes of negative population health outcomes. Rather than support
ineffective downstream interventions, policymakers, public health

Neoliberalism? Noncommunicable Disease Policies and the Global Political
Economy of Risk, 39 HEALTH & PLACE 204, 205, 207 (2016); Michael P. Kelly &
Mary Barker, Why Is Changing Health-Related Behaviour So Difficult?, 136 PUB.
HEALTH 109, 110 (2016).
136. Jason Corburn et al., Health in All Urban Policy: City Services Through the
Prism of Health, 91 J. URB. HEALTH 623, 623 (2014).
137. See generally Nicholas Freudenberg et al., New Approaches for Moving

Upstream: How State and Local Health Departments Can Transform Practice to
Reduce Health Inequalities, 42 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 46S (2015).
138. Id. at 46S.

139. KATHERINE LEVINE EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & CONOR LEBLANC, BOS.
UNIV. INITIATIVE ON CITIES, 2016 MENINO SURVEY OF MAYORS 9 (2017).
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professionals, and advocates should instead advance these upstream
strategies that address the root causes of food insecurity and dietrelated health disparities.
The following sections offer some
promising upstream strategies.
A. Increasing the Minimum Wage
The federal minimum wage, currently at $7.25, is significantly
below the living wage, even in the poorest parts of the country.
According to MIT’s Living Wage Calculator, which provides for a
“low-cost” and “nutritionally adequate” diet,140 the living wage for
Buffalo County, South Dakota—the poorest county in the nation—
was $10.11 an hour in 2016 for a single adult, while the national living
wage was $15.84.141 The federal minimum wage is also significantly
below its inflation-adjusted high of $11.18 in 1968 despite large
increases in worker productivity since that time.142 The minimum
wage would be well over $18 if it had kept pace with productivity
increases since 1968.143 The Fight for $15 campaign and other efforts
to increase the minimum wage have proven popular and, at least at
the state level, effective: twenty-one states and Washington, D.C.
have raised their minimum wages since 2014.144 A national minimum
of $15 would raise the wages of millions of people among the working
poor and improve their ability to procure healthy food.

140. CAREY ANNE NADEAU, MASS. INST. TECH., LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR,
USER’S GUIDE/TECHNICAL NOTES: 2017 UPDATE 5 (2017), http://livingwage.mit.edu/
resources/Living-Wage-User-Guide-and-Technical-Notes-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QS7X-6PTH].
141. CAREY ANNE NADEAU, MASS. INST. TECH., LIVING WAGE CALCULATOR,
LIVING WAGE CALCULATION FOR BUFFALO COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 1,
http://livingwage.mit.edu/counties/46017 [https://perma.cc/9EYH-TLET]; AMY K.
GLASMEIER & CAREY ANNE NADEAU, MASS. INST. TECH., LIVING WAGE
CALCULATOR, RESULTS FROM THE 2016 DATA UPDATE 1, http://livingwage.mit.edu/
articles/23-results-from-the-2016-data-update [https://perma.cc/ME84-VEHD].
142. See Christopher Ingraham, The U.S. Has One of the Stingiest Minimum Wage
Policies of Any Wealthy Nation, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/29/the-u-s-has-one-of-thestingiest-minimum-wage-policies-of-any-wealthy-nation/?utm_term=.871f514b11a5
[https://perma.cc/U8WA-XPQS]; see also LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., ECON. POLICY
INST., WAGE STAGNATION IN NINE CHARTS 10 (2015).
143. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 142, at 10.
144. Minimum Wage Tracker, ECON. POLICY INST., https://www.epi.org/minimumwage-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/R5PY-5EQ2].
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Strengthening Labor Protections

The working poor often contend with job insecurity, unpredictable
hours, and unpaid sick leave, in addition to low wages.145 Precarious
employment reduces workers’ ability to plan meals or shop for
healthy food while increasing stress levels, which can lead to a
cascade of negative dietary and health outcomes.146 Food security
advocates should not only support stronger labor protections at the
state and federal level, but should also campaign for federal
legislation repealing state “right-to-work” laws that weaken workers’
ability to organize. At the municipal level, policies like paid sick
leave, enforcement against tipped wage theft, and requirements that
employers regularize shift workers’ schedules (“fair workweek
laws”)147 create job stability and improve the wellbeing of low-wage
workers. Such policies would enable these workers to better provide
for the nutritional needs of their households.
C.

Expanding the Welfare State

Increasing wages and protections for the working poor, while
important, will not substantially improve the material living
conditions of many Americans. Around half of the United States’
population does not work and roughly eighty percent of the poor do
Additionally, the majority of the non-working
not work.148
population are members of vulnerable groups, including children, the
elderly, and the disabled, who either cannot or should not work.149
To ensure that the majority of the people in poverty are food secure
and financially stable, the federal government should expand benefits

145. E.g., Joan Benach & Carles Muntaner, Precarious Employment and Health:
Developing a Research Agenda, 61 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 276,
276–77 (2007); Julia R. Henly & Susan J. Lambert, Unpredictable Work Timing in
Retail Jobs: Implications for Employee Work-Life Conflict, 67 ILR REV. 986, 986–94,
1010–12 (2014); Emile Tompa et al., Precarious Employment Experiences and Their
Health Consequences: Towards a Theoretical Framework, 28 WORK 209, 213 (2007).
146. See, e.g., Benach & Muntaner, supra note 145; Maria Carlota Borba Brum et
al., Shift Work and Its Association with Metabolic Disorders, 7 DIABETOLOGY &
METABOLIC SYNDROME 45, 45–51 (2015); Tompa et al., supra note 145, at 214.
147. Press Release, City of New York, Mayor de Blasio, Speaker Mark-Viverito
Announces that New York City Is the Largest City to End Abusive Scheduling
Practices in the Fast Food and Retail Industries (May 30, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/372-17/mayor-de-blasio-speaker-mark-viverito-that-newyork-city-the-largest-city-end#/0 [https://perma.cc/G95K-YHTL].
148. Matt Bruenig, Who Was Poor in 2016 and Why Our System Keeps Failing
Them, PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT (Sept. 12, 2017), https://peoplespolicyproject.org/
2017/09/12/who-was-in-poverty-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/R5CF-KB89].
149. Id.
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for people outside of the workforce, focusing on the unemployed,
children, the elderly, the disabled, caretakers, and students.150
D. Protecting and Expanding SNAP
SNAP is one of the United States’ most important social programs,
providing about forty million Americans with benefits each month in
2017.151 To receive these benefits, individuals and households must
be at or below the poverty line, or in some cases, no more than
slightly above it.152 SNAP should be protected from proposals in
Congress to reduce the program’s budget or to transform it into a
block grant, which would result in deep cuts and make the program
less responsive during economic downturns.153 Additionally, the
program’s meager benefits should be increased; the average
beneficiary only received $126 a month or $1.40 per meal in 2017.154
A 2016 study found that raising monthly SNAP benefits by only $30
per person would increase the consumption of healthy foods, reduce
the consumption of fast foods, and increase food security.155
E.

Protecting and Expanding Universal Free School Lunch

The nation’s school lunch (and breakfast) programs provide
nutritious meals that, for low-income households, meet a large
portion of the caloric needs of school-age children and save parents
the cost of these meals.156 The federal community eligibility provision
allows school districts with high percentages of students who qualify
for free meals to serve meals free to all students in the school.157
Ensuring that this program is not cut and encouraging more school
districts to use the community eligibility provision to expand universal
150. See id.
151. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO
SNAP 1 (2017).
152. Id. at 3.
153. DOROTHY ROSENBAUM, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, BLOCKGRANTING SNAP WOULD ABANDON DECADES-LONG FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO
REDUCING HUNGER 2–8 (2017).
154. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 151, at 3.
155. PATRICIA M. ANDERSON & KRISTIN F. BUTCHER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SNAP BENEFITS, GROCERY SPENDING,
DIET QUALITY, AND THE ADEQUACY OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES’ RESOURCES 1, 3, 5–
14 (2016).
156. Craig Gundersen, Food Assistance Programs and Child Health, 25 FUTURE OF
CHILDREN 91, 92 (2015).
157. MADELEINE LEVIN & ZOË NEUBERGER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, COMMUNITY ELIGIBILITY: MAKING HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS HUNGER
FREE 5 (2013).
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free school lunch throughout the country would help provide free,
healthy meals to all children and reduce the stigma associated with
free lunch.158
CONCLUSION
Food policy remains dominated by a “Let Them Eat Kale”
perspective that has emphasized subsidizing conventional food
retailers to increase food access while shifting attention from the
more fundamental upstream causes of malnourishment and health
disparities: social inequality, race, gender, class oppression, and
poverty. These types of food access policies persist because they fit
neoliberal and conservative ideologies that privilege market solutions
to social problems, are politically popular by addressing justifiable
community desires for new, full-service supermarkets, and promise a
relatively simple fix to the complex problems of obesity,
malnourishment, and diet-related diseases. They are often described
as food justice initiatives even if they do not address the underlying
injustices of economic inequality, poverty, and oppression. However,
a growing body of evidence reveals that mere access does not provide
such a fix and that eliminating diet-related health disparities requires
moving far upstream. Some might argue that debates over the
effectiveness of expanding food retail may be interesting but are
ultimately irrelevant; having a supermarket in one’s community is
always better than none, and in the current political climate, in which
basic support programs like SNAP are threatened, it is better to move
forward with programs that at least improve the retail environment in
low-income neighborhoods. However, in creating the perception of
change—without actually addressing inequality—downstream
interventions like new supermarkets may diminish pressure for
broader social change.
The goal should be to create policies that build capital within
communities and distribute our country’s substantial wealth more
equitably, while providing living wages and labor standards so that
people have time and money to provide for their needs. These steps
may be more difficult to achieve politically than expanding access to
supermarkets, but only by looking beyond food can we build a society
in which everyone has the ability to eat well. There are no shortcuts
to eliminating food poverty.

158. See generally JANET POPPENDIECK, FREE FOR ALL: FIXING SCHOOL FOOD
AMERICA 190 (2011).
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